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This conference on the New Deal's fiftieth anniversary has focused not
on the New Deal's basic philosophy or the administration of particular
programs, but on the general problems of the administrative state. The
very fact that one might have a successful conference with such a focus is
interesting, for it tells us what is not on the public agenda of debate. We
have not discussed the New Deal's major public works programs-the
TVA, the WPA, and their successors. We have not discussed its major
benefit program, social security. We have talked about regulation in gen-
eral, but not about the regulation of securities or of the minimum wage.
And the discussion of the frailties of our labor law, while interesting,
sounds theoretical, for there is no serious political effort to repeal the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
We have not talked more about the New Deal's substantive programs
mostly because these programs are a well-accepted part of modern govern-
ment. Their general acceptance may reflect, as Stewart suggests, the com-
patibility at a deep level of principles underlying both the New Deal and
its more "laissez faire" predecessors.1 It may reflect simple pragmatic suc-
cess in satisfying human needs. Or it may reflect the passage of time.
Whatever the reason, debate about most New Deal programs concerns not
"whether," but "how much." It is the Great Society, not the New Deal,
which is the object of political attack. Even radical curtailment (or modifi-
cation) of New Deal regulation of transportation and communication is
taken as a critique of particular programs, not as an indictment of govern-
ment intervention in general. Some old programs, such as securities regu-
lation, are generally considered to work well; some new problems, such as
environmental pollution or worker safety, are generally considered to re-
quire some form of governmental intervention.
Instead, our discussion has focused on the great structural problem of
administrative control, a problem not solved by the New Deal or since:
Who will regulate the regulators? How, through the wise use of manage-
ment techniques, internal procedures, or court controls, can we assure a
better regulatory product? How can we increase the likelihood that gov-
ernmental intervention-in whatever form-will in fact help the people it
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is supposed to benefit? The papers presented do not answer these ques-
tions, nor do they seek directly to do so. Yet they are relevant to the ques-
tion, for they discuss at length the efficacy of "court control" as an an-
swer. And it is of particular interest that so many of them reflect
disillusionment with, or even hostility to, reliance upon courts and legal
actions as effective instruments for bringing about either more efficient, or
more fair, administrative actions.
This mood-if it exists-is consistent with New Deal administrative
philosophy. After all, New Deal lawyers and judges sought to free the
agencies from judicial control-a control that they believed interfered with
sound substantive policymaking. Courts were to defer to agency "exper-
tise" on matters of substance unless those adversely affected could show
that under no plausible state of the world would the agency's decisions
seem reasonable.' Procedural controls were minimal as well. Agencies
could legislate simply by giving notice and allowing comment-or less.
The SEC promulgated Rule 10(b)(5) without a record and with minimal
debate. A judicial gloss did not put meat on these very bare procedural
bones until well after the Second World War.
In part, the minimal nature of procedural control reflected a belief that
the agencies, not the courts or a set of procedures or some collection of
special advocates, would best protect the "public interest." For example, a
carrier could (and still can) demand a hearing and seek court review when
the commission suspended a tariff, thereby raising rates, but the consumer
could not (and still cannot) demand a hearing when the commission re-
fused to suspend the tariff and thus allowed the rate increase.3 There was
thought to be no need for a hearing in the latter case, for the agency, not a
consumer group, would protect the "public interest." Fairness demanded
only that the carrier, when adversely affected, have the opportunity to
create a record and to protest to the courts.
Insofar as there was a felt need to control the agencies, it was presumed
that that need would be satisfied by the "canons" of the regulatory disci-
pline itself. One need only read the words of Dean Landis" and his con-
temporaries5 to detect the prevalent belief that "regulation" and "adminis-
tration" were branches of "science," to be practiced by professionals. That
2. See Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of
Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 721 (1975).
3. See generally Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
4. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
5. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES' (1937) (Brownlow Committee); U.S.
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT THE INDEPEN-
DENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1949) (Hoover Commission).
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science, practiced conscientiously by professional civil servants, would lead
to sound, fair outcomes. As with lawyers, doctors, architects, or account-
ants, "self-regulation" was thought to be the proper mode of regulation
for those who practiced regulation as a craft.
By the late 1960's and 1970's this view had broken down. Students of
the subject had little confidence in the scientific accuracy of agency deci-
sionmaking. But they found no consensus as to either regulatory ends or
means. Some felt that agencies were "captured" by those they were to
regulate.' Others felt that agencies fanatically pursued their single mis-
sions with tunnel vision and without common sense.7 Still others felt that
agencies were too often lazy, unfair, mistaken, or all three.' Regardless of
the theory, different groups, for different reasons, argued that one or an-
other agency was "out of control" and acting "against," rather than "in,"
the public interest. Along with diminished confidence in the effectiveness
of "internal control" came an increased demand for increased court super-
vision of agency decisionmaking 9 And, as the papers in this Symposium
show, the courts responded with increased scrutiny of individual decisions,
increased attention to procedural requirements, and increased liberality in
allowing the assertion of claims against the government.
The suggestion that I find implicit in much that has been said here is
that courts are unlikely to expand much further their efforts to control
agency behavior. This suggestion does not reflect doubt about the need for
such control. It is not difficult to find examples of such need. The sugges-
tion does reflect skepticism, however, about the courts' ability to provide
further controls. For example, to what extent can courts significantly af-
fect agency behavior by carefully reviewing for substantial evidence, deni-
als of disability benefits or findings of anti-union motivated discharges?
Fiss' article, in accurately describing the problem of increasing court bu-
reaucracy,10 suggests that the judge's role in this area is inevitably limited.
A judge can do little more in such a case than read the record and ask if
the result is reasonable. The records are lengthy and the number of such
cases vast. Given the enormous judicial workload, which has doubled in
the last five years in our circuit to 200 cases per appellate judge annu-
ally," these cases are prime candidates for delegation. In run of the mill
6. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND
THE ICC (1970); T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST
(1970).
7. For a cross-section of criticisms of the regulatory process, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 106-35 (1979).
8. See id. at 32-35.
9. See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 15-35, 341-68 (1982).
10. See Fiss, Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983).
11. During the 12-month period ending June 30, 1982, 1,040 cases were filed in the First Circuit,
see 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
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cases, a law clerk or an administrative staff member may be assigned ini-
tial responsibility for checking the record for "problems"; the individual
judge's decision thus becomes an "institutional" decision. The time needed
to conduct a thorough review in all (or many) such cases is simply
lacking.
To what extent can the courts control directly the substantive outcome
of agency policy decisions? Judge Leventhal and Judge Bazelon have de-
bated this question.12 The former urges a "hard look" at certain types of
substantive agency decisions; 13 the latter is skeptical of the courts' abili-
ties.1 ' Yellin's paper too is skeptical of the "hard look" approach, at least
where scientific questions are involved. 5 Moreover, scientific factors may
be so mixed with ethical, political, or related matters that a special scien-
tific "court" like the one Yellin proposes, schooled in "science" alone,
would not necessarily help. Yellin's observations are equally applicable to
areas outside the hard sciences. For evidence of the difficulty that courts
have in bringing about substantive changes in agency policy, one need
only review the efforts of the District of Columbia Circuit to affect the
substance of television regulation. 0 A similar review of the Supreme
Court cases related to the regulation of natural gas suggests that a court is
no more qualified than an agency to determine the substance of regulatory
decisions.
7
To what extent can courts instead control agency behavior through
"generosity" in allowing judicial review, in finding private causes of ac-
tion, and in providing procedural protections? The Shapiro and Mashaw
papers together suggest that, here too, a court's impact is inevitably lim-
ited. Shapiro notes the expansion of court review in the areas of formal
and informal rulemaking and in formal adjudication.18 He notes that
there is room to offer more extensive review of informal adjudicatory deci-
STATES COURTS 190, compared with only 563 during the 12-month period ending June 30, 1977, see
1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 300.
12. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), cert
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
13. 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring). Leventhal had coined the "hard look" standard
six years earlier in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
14. 541 F.2d at 66-68 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
15. See Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Decisions for
Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 US. 923 (1971); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1971), clarified, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). These cases are discussed in S. BREYER & R. STEW-
ART, supra note 7, at 377-98.
17. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). These cases are discussed in S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
supra note 7, at 421-45.
18. Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1491-95 (1983).
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sionmaking, but in doing so he calls attention to the vast number of such
decisions made each day, the vast diversity of subject matter, the need for
speedy agency determination, the limited nature of court resources and the
slowness with which courts move.19 In other words, the institutional na-
ture of the court decisionmaking process makes it difficult to see how the
courts can expand the role of judicial review in this area in an effective,
principled manner.
Mashaw provides a set of institutional explanations for what some
might see as a "retreat" from such "strong" judicial review.2" At bottom
he sees the strength of the courts as lying in their ability to decide issues
fairly. Accuracy is less important. judges base their decisions on a record,
which typically reflects a trial, a hearing or some other procedure under
which lawyers present evidence and make arguments. The system is fair
(at least if the contesting parties have roughly equivalent resources), for
the parties have a roughly equivalent chance to present their own side of
the story and to contest that of their opponents. It may even be reasonably
accurate as to typically adjudicative matters, such as who did what to
whom. But these typical courtroom procedures may be less accurate when
applied to contested, uncertain matters of legislative policy. Is saccharine
really dangerous? What about carnauba wax? A record on these subjects
made at length by paid advocates reflects what they choose to put into it.
Such a record, once made, is not readily changed, and the judge who re-
views the record cannot use the telephone to clarify obscurity or to dis-
cover, by calling different experts, the present state of scientific
knowledge. Where what really counts from society's point of view is that
a matter be decided fairly, court-type procedures and judicial review are
likely to help. Justice, after all, not truth, is the aim of the judicial system.
Where society, however, is vitally interested in the accuracysof the result,
and particularly where legislative facts are involved, one must be less san-
guine about the usefulness of legalistic procedures.
Finally, we are left uncertain even about the extent to which the courts
can help by imposing "due process" type procedural requirements when
particularly important interests are at stake. Simon's paper casts doubt
upon the substantive effectiveness of those requirements in the very area
where they might have been thought most useful, namely in offering pro-
tection to those entitled to minimum-income cash grants.21 Such hearings
may, of course, limit the number of agency mistakes, but they also en-
courage the agency to promulgate detailed eligibility rules which, in turn,
help legally to justify its actions. Simon points out that detailed rules may
19. Id. at 1500-19.
20. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1150-58 (1983).
21. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
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lead to increased fairness in one sense: Like cases are more likely to be
treated alike. But he also notes that detailed rules leave less room for
agency discretion, making it more difficult for the agency to pay attention
to the special needs of the client. Detailed rules diminish fairness in that
special sense encapsulated in the ancient tradition of "equity"-a notion
that often suggests treating seemingly similar cases differently. The need
for equity is a significant check on the ability of the courts to provide
better outcomes by insisting upon the creation of agency rules, or even by
imposing procedural requirements that encourage the creation of such
rules.
In sum, we have heard a description of courts limited in their power to
control agencies, limited in part by their limited resources, in part by the
difficulty of obtaining adequate information, in part by the slowness of
their reactions, in part by other tendencies to create rules that work by
limiting discretion, and in part by their institutional tendency to sacrifice
equity for law. Moreover, all these tendencies reflect institutional biases
which are unlikely to be overcome and which, for other reasons, should
not be changed.
The growing disenchantment-if I correctly catch the tone of the dis-
course-with the courts' abilities to control the work of the agencies sug-
gests a reaffirmation of what are by now traditional principles of adminis-
trative law. But it does not suggest that we should abandon the effort to
control the agencies or to improve their work. Rather, one can hear calls
for controls of a more sophisticated sort. Yellin, for example, suggests cre-
ating a career path for scientists of promise that will bring them into the
agencies in positions where their knowledge is likely to influence policy.
22
Ackerman provides us not only with a framework for thinking about reg-
ulatory problems, but also with a demonstration of the importance of
teaching lawyers, administrators, and judges statistics as well as econom-
ics. 2 3 Such an effort would make easier the implementation of his other
suggestion-that policymakers be induced or required to consider the im-
plications of their decisions by using an economic framework for analy-
sis.24 Such a framework, while not determining any particular outcome,
may at least help to eliminate from consideration outcomes that are likely
to prove counterproductive.
Government intervention, then, is well accepted in principle; the need
for controls on, and improvements of, many governmental programs is evi-
dent; the courts' abilities to provide the needed checks are highly limited.
The exploration of more sophisticated, individualized control techniques,
22. Yellin, supra note 15, at 1327-31.
23. Ackerman, Foreword. Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1111 (1983).
24. Id. at 1124.
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based upon knowledge of substantive subject matter, thus seems war-
ranted. The key words, however, are "individualized" and "substantive."
For, if this conference has a "lesson," it is one of return to the New
Deal's skepticism of the value of judicial control-a skepticism concerning
both general and procedural approaches to the problem of controlling the
administrative state. The New Deal created programs pragmatically. In
doing so, it created a new kind of government with a new set of problems.
This conference suggests that we must approach those problems pragmati-
cally. We shall not find generalized, legal answers to such questions as
where and whether government intervention is needed, what type of inter-
vention is appropriate, or how that intervention can be controlled in prac-
tice. Rather, armed with appropriate intellectual tools, we are now urged
to search for individual, substantive answers.
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